Law Text Culture
Volume 23 Legal Materiality

Article 6

2019

Excerpt from Cultural Techniques of Law. Remarks on a Format of
Legal Studies
Fabian Steinhauer
Goethe University, Frankfurt

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc

Recommended Citation
Steinhauer, Fabian, Excerpt from Cultural Techniques of Law. Remarks on a Format of Legal
Studies, Law Text Culture, 23, 2019, 79-90.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol23/iss1/6
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Excerpt from Cultural Techniques of Law. Remarks on a Format of Legal Studies
Abstract
What is at stake here? I want to present ‘cultural techniques of law’ as a research and pedagogical
programme - a ‘format’ - which has developed between the disciplines of law, media studies and cultural
studies; or more precisely, at the interstices of these respective disciplinary boundaries (Vismann 2012a).
I do so in the form of an essay and try to make some further suggestions for the programme. The essay is
written from a position that is not fully identical with ‘law’. The term ‘format’ is meant to reflect the
existence of such a programme, without claiming that it has been realised successfully. Such an
incomplete identification of law with the method of its study is not a co-incidence. The starting point to
think about law ought to be law’s difference rather than identity. It is in this sense that cultural techniques
of law are the techniques of differentiation, modification and transmission that reproduce law. Culture
does not refer to a historically stabilised identity, but only to what is made and reproduced. Cultural
techniques of law are techniques that ‘operationalise’ legal differences: they divide, translate and transmit
legal differences along (pre)formed, directed, exterior routes.
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Excerpt from
Cultural Techniques of Law.
Remarks on a Format of Legal Studies
Fabian Steinhauer1
1 Symmetrical dogmatics and parajuridical training
What is at stake here? I want to present ‘cultural techniques of law’
as a research and pedagogical programme - a ‘format’ - which has
developed between the disciplines of law, media studies and cultural
studies; or more precisely, at the interstices of these respective
disciplinary boundaries (Vismann 2012a). I do so in the form of an
essay and try to make some further suggestions for the programme.
The essay is written from a position that is not fully identical with
‘law’. The term ‘format’ is meant to reflect the existence of such a
programme, without claiming that it has been realised successfully.
Such an incomplete identification of law with the method of its study
is not a co-incidence. The starting point to think about law ought to
be law’s difference rather than identity. It is in this sense that cultural
techniques of law are the techniques of differentiation, modification and
transmission that reproduce law. Culture does not refer to a historically
stabilised identity, but only to what is made and reproduced. Cultural
techniques of law are techniques that ‘operationalise’ legal differences:
they divide, translate and transmit legal differences along (pre)formed,
directed, exterior routes. Research about law’s cultural techniques rests
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on these two premises: legal differences are reproduced and they are
‘operationalised’.

What is the point of this peculiar ‘ format’? Why shall we not proceed as
before? The programme intends to serve as a kind of hinge between
academic studies of law and cultural- and media studies and addresses
scholars of law, humanities, media and cultural studies. It could also
be described as part of what Latour termed a “symmetrical dogmatics”
of law (1995). He conceived of a “symmetrical anthropology”, which
he did not explicitly sketch out as a theorisation of constitutionalism,
but which nonetheless helps us to think through foundational juridical
issues. It aims at being a historical epistemology that thinks with
its own, constitutive division, whilst simultaneously being reflective
about the exclusions that this process engenders and the ways in
which the excluded continue to exert a constitutive role. In Latour’s
anthropological context, this approach allows thinking with and
about what escapes the boundaries of humanness and yet continues
to shape it (for example, the entities that he calls “things”). This kind
of working-with or co-operation (Mitarbeit) is full of complications.
It would neither be accurately characterised as an interdisciplinary
“pairing”, nor can this cooperation described as being sufficiently
contradictory to be labelled dialectical. My comments here serve to
present these complications.
The proposed research programme of cultural techniques is rooted in
a critique of modernity’s constitution, its self-imaginaries, and systems
of self-descriptions, as far as these are grounded in internalist claims
and epistemic differentiations that are monopolistic and exclusionary.
One such internalist view of legal self-constitution is the idea that law
reproduces itself with the help of continuous and all-encompassing main
medium, for example, with language, sense perception or consciousness.
Critiquing such a view, cultural techniques as a research programme
particularly attends to ‘silent’ knowledge techniques in order to trace
ruptures in legal reproduction. Muteness is not only a theoretical
concept, but also a metaphor for interruptions of continuity of language
and senses. Something extinguishes and something else approaches
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(rückt an) over the course of law’s continuous reproduction. Thereby
some processes come to our attention that can neither be explained
by referring to law as a “semantic power” (posited, but not defined in
von Bogdandy/Venzke 2014), or portray it as an “idea of sovereign
consciousness” (Foucault 2000: 16) ... What is metaphorically called
‘silent knowledge’ occurs in a sphere that both exceeds and lies beyond
the nameable or conceptually conceivable. The effects of muteness, that
is to say, of such a constructed muteness, occurs in law’s subterrains and
also contributes (mitarbeitet) to its original foundation and justification
(Begründung). As a result, it forms part of what Cornelia Vismann had
termed “arca-logic” (2012b). As law’s medium that is located ‘under’
or ‘below’ causes and foundations (Gründen), the arca-logic of cultural
techniques participates in the production and reproduction of law.
Cultural techniques form and shape arca-logic’s archives, principles and
premises, but also are part of the origin which disguises itself, which
it has always already has done from its very inception.

Yet law’s cultural techniques ought not to be mistaken as
foundation or as a reason (Grund). They also cannot be explained by
or mystified into subjects. Although the research format of cultural
techniques depicts in detail the technological and mediated substrata
of ‘foundations’, something which dogmatic approaches to legal
scholarship unreflexively take for granted, such substrata do not
necessarily represent better foundations. Insights into the underlying
workings of law rather make visible the subversions through which law
works and reproduces differences. Law operationalises the substrata, but
never extinguishes them. That is why this proposed research format does
not purport to bring law ‘back’ to foundational ‘facts’. Rather it seeks
to delineate the circumstances in which law differentiates and remains
fundamentally equivocal - with both precision and ambiguity. This
endeavour is thus both critical and constructive: it is critical of the ways
in which juridical reasoning selectively represents law’s unavoidable and
necessary demi-monde, and it is constructive in the sense that a study
of law’s cultural techniques highlights law’s constant need to cooperate
(with others and us). Law is made-together and made-with.
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This research programme does not intend to refute or negate the
role of language and its meaning for law. But it also seeks to point out
limitations originating from language as well as the ones relating to it.
A study of law’s cultural techniques also takes into account premises
that have their origin in science studies theories, such as in Latour. They
allow for a reconstruction of knowledges that have hitherto remained
unexamined because they were invisible under the radars of human
subject, its laws, causalities and rationality.
...

On “symmetrical dogmatics”: Symmetry is not synonymous to
‘supplement’, ‘harmony’ or ‘ joining’, but rather denotes the double
existence of law’s recurring differentiation, which occurs together and
simultaneously with a carefully constructed internalist programme
in the study of law. Although I would portray research into law’s
cultural techniques as forming part of basic research 2, I do not claim
that it satisfies the craving for meaning (“Geltungssucht”) or provides
fundamental meanings and foundations. Law’s theories and practices
are remarkably successful in (re)producing their own meaning - even
when legal decisions lead to nowhere - and they are not in need any
support from media or cultural studies to assert their symbolic meaning.
The mutual interest in and the extent of decentralised cooperation and
coordination between law and the rest of society are, however, too big
to be determined by a particular legal symbolic meaning alone.3 A
focus on law’s cultural techniques can take account of the continuous
“re-entry of the Other” within law, a process which also simultaneously
occurs within law’s “boundary objects” (Star and Griesemer 1989).
These already form part of law’s decision-making and differentiation. It
is in this sense that symmetrical dogmatics is also paradogmatic. And
research on cultural techniques of law can be understood as forming
part of a parajuridical formation or training. Such a parajuridical
programme traces passages in which transmissions and translations
dissect and examine law in a continuous, historical way. There is neither
a mind nor a being, not to mention a consciousness, of which such an
examination and disentanglement (Auseinandersetzung) are part or
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could be placated by (as in early laws regarding pictures, discussed
in Steinhauer 2013: 96-114). All forms of reflection go together with
blindness (Steinhauer 2009b). ...

Research of law’s cultural techniques does not claim completeness
towards the study of law because it is based on the premise that law
comprises fragmented and irreconcilable discourses and rationalities.
It however aims to account for and think with contradictions,
ruptures, conflicts and uncertainties of legal practice. It also puts itself
into competition with other kinds of knowledge which have their
own ‘juridisms’: norms, canons, standards, classics and rules of the
humanities; natural science’s focus on heredity; or norm formations
in practices outside academia or its disciplines. This implies that there
is all a greater need to continue writing about histories of conflicts,
unruly cooperation and unpacified coordination. A focus on the cultural
techniques of law attends to and anticipates abysses of legal rationality
rather than focusing on questions of law’s foundation (Legendre 2010).
...

2 Cultural techniques and textuality
Impetus for research into cultural techniques of law has also come
from works on law’s textuality by Augsberg (2009), Ladeur (2016)
and Vesting (2011-9). ... They share the view that there is no specific
and definable crux of what legal studies ought to be. Whilst they do
not deny that legal knowledge is theoretically and practically distinct
from other kinds of knowledges and needs to be distinguished from
them, this realisation alone does not suffice. The recognition of law’s
difference does not rest on philosophical notions of law’s substance,
form, method, meaning or process. Rather it rests on law’s disquiet,
and law ought to be thought from this point of restlessness. Law’s
references are both its own (eigen) and outside itself. I would denote
law’s mode of referentiality, its way of reconnecting and reproducing,
as one of hyper-referentiality than an exclusive self-reference. It
constitutes itself through an act of separation from a reference, whilst
also simultaneously ecstatically constituting and continuing the
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divisive distinction within the reference itself. Law differentiates itself
through its references, yet such acts of distinction also permeate the
very references themselves. ... Wherever we encounter law’s identity,
alterity is already there at work. One could interpret this as an empty
tautology of circumstances in which only law is able to (re)produce law,
as in some readings of Kelsen’s positivism. But the tautology does not
work without complications because law’s (re)production depends on
sharing (dividing) and transmitting legal knowledge.4 Law is in conflict
(Auseinandersetzung) with itself by dismantling (auseinandersetzt) itself
and effecting both identity and alterity. It attaches itself to something
that might not be legal and is exterior to it. Law’s limits are yet also
internal; they go through itself. They are both insistent, as well as
intervening. In the midst of law, we find files, staples of paper, witnesses,
sluggish bodies, networks, stations, a selection of programmes, court
architectures, high and low ceiling rooms, streets, morasses, and much
more. In the midst of a legal subject, we may find flesh, skin, horn,
hair, capital and assets, organisations and apparatus. In the midst of
persons, we find things. The juridical is permeated by the political,
moral, religious and all the forces that it promised to repudiate. Legal
positivism is rattled with uncertainty and harbours a sense of lack and
insufficiency within it, regardless of whether such a lack is productive
or not. ... Law can be understood as the effect of a continuing process
of differentiation that is always also lacking; the effect of such a lack
is permanent openness.5 [...] Instead of being content with empty
and internalist self-sufficiency, legal research that follows this insight
would identify and particularly focus on issues which manifest law’s
lack of differentiation and examine the specific ways in which it deals
with such a lack.
3 Media studies and law
Media studies have had a long-standing interest in law. In German
media theory, research into cultural techniques has incorporated diverse
approaches that have had interest in processes that fall within the
legal field. Works by Dommann (2014), Gaderer (2012), Giessmann
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(2014), Kossmann (2012), Nellen, Siegert (2006), Sprenger (2015)
and Vismann (2008, 2011, 2012) share such a specific media studies
approach and it could form part of a programme of symmetrical
dogmatics and para-juridical training. They resist the imposition and
the ideal of an internalist self-proclamation prevalent in the German
academic landscape, which insist that only lawyers are lawyers, lawyers
are only lawyers, and that knowledge about law and legislations are
exclusive or privileged domains of the Faculties of Law. ... The subdiscipline of legal history and its related disciplines share an interest
with media studies: they examine the ways in which law fabricates
itself with the help of something exterior to its self-definition. Lessig
has expressed this with his well-known statement that “code is law”,
but also unfortunately smoothed over the innate tension between
identity and alterity that are at play in the moment when law refers to
cultural techniques. Law does not recognise itself in the code. Rather
the code repeats and re-enforces the conditions of cooperation and
coordination, which are regarded as ‘law’ in other social contexts.
More interestingly and maintaining the inherent tension (but also the
contradiction) between media and law, Kittler observed how media
techniques are co-constitutive of law (2014). His assertion of media’s
importance is not trivial (“what else should law produce but media?”),
as he brings into vision media’s juridicality, which is different from
legal ways of knowing. This distinction does not mean that media
is not juridical. Rather, media’s juridicality is similar to the effect of
what Schütz described as law outside law (2012). One of the central
modes by which legal knowledges operates is by separating itself from
others. Similarly, media techniques entail juridical operations of
decision-making, openness and blockages of access (Sprenger 2013).
Also media define social categories, such as goods, things, personalities
and subjectivities, notion of publicness and privacy, and of sharing
and limiting. The processes of ordering and co-ordinating, voting and
conflict resolution - all of which are often regarded as juridical processes
- have become embedded in things. These things are not inert ‘facts’,
but they are the modes through which ‘law’ is made without ‘legal’
methods. ...
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I want to illustrate this point with an example of law relating to
personality in pictures. The legal practice in this area is concerned
with images to a large extent. Yet legal dogma has neither developed a
particular concept of what an image is, nor a deeper conceptualisation
of its own treatment of images (Steinhauer 2009a). A lawyer makes
decisions about images without being a scholar or theorist of images.
Lawyers think that law decides over images; scholars of images
think that images decide law. Regardless of these different selfunderstandings, the law of personality keeps on reproducing itself in
both the legal concept of personality, as well as in images, continuing
to carry out the expectation which a legal subject holds in the form of
rights to an image and within (as part of) an image.
Knowledge of images remains in the status of an ‘other’ knowledge.
... Scholarship of images is inflected with its own juridicality. Every
knowledge of an image hence is bounded - and this boundary remains
as contested as much as unsurpassable (see Hubermann 2009 on Kafka’s
‘Before the Law’). This is why it is impossible to discard law - or take
off the legal lens - and invoke and rely on allegedly innocent or pure
‘facts’. Beyond law, there are not only others than law, but also often
another law. This does not mean that it is impossible to differentiate. The
boundaries between law and image remain recalcitrant and cannot be
ignored or denied. And the differentiation between image and no-image
cannot be relinquished, same as the differentiation between law and
non-law. We need to take a leap, so to say, and cultivate a knowledge,
but not of the kind that engages in internalist self-assertions. It would
entail reconstructing differentiations that cannot be traced back to a
common starting point and uniform discourse, but which only retain
their differences in diversity. It would be necessary, however, not to
get lost in the infinity of differences and differentiations. For purposes
of critique and analysis, the focus would need to be on tracing those
differentiations that have been regarded as ‘really useful’. ... Attending
to law’s Others means to think about the lines, conflicts, definitions
and exclusions, from which law is (re)produced (for examples of such
analyses, see Steinhauer 2015).
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4 Guiding Questions
The main question which the format of cultural techniques of law
raises for legal research and pedagogy is: how is knowledge of and
around law transmitted and shared? This question entails four aspects.
The first aspect concerns law’s foundations embedded in certain
media and cultural techniques, as well as production of a certain kind
of legality through media and practices in society. Writing, codex,
diagrams, commentaries, certificates, but also court room architectures
are well-known examples of such media. Computers and their networks
are some of the most discussed examples since the nineteen-sixties.
Exegetic processes of juridical hermeneutic are also well-known
instances of legal techniques, much of which are nowadays found outside
of orality, writing and printed books. Rhetoric and dogmatics are some
of the most well-known paradigms of assembling cultural techniques
into a discipline.

The second aspect of the question touches upon how law coconstitutes media and cultural techniques. Rules of censorship and book
privileges, the shaping the development of book, are some historical
examples. More recent examples are coded privileges and access
limitations that implement digital licenses and usage rights. Here, legal
normativity has become ‘built in’: codes are technical achievements of
engineers and programmers; but they are also a juridical feat by which
a technical object becomes ‘normed’, receives an imperative dimension
(it orders the realm of what is possible and legally permitted), and
delineates and (co-)determines over social rules of access. ...
The question raises a third aspect about processes of transmission
and translation between and within cultures (historically, for example).

Lastly, the question addresses foundations of media law. The concept
of public media, in particular, lead to an entanglement of legal, media
and cultural-technical phenomena. Legal knowledge is not only a sensephenomenon, it is also an effect of media and of cultural techniques.
... Law is not only a creation of state sovereignty, but media changes
produce shifts in legal and normative practices beyond instances of
‘state’ ‘reasoning’. Moreover, structural changes within law do not
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only arise from institutionalised politics and economy. New media and
cultural techniques change and shape whatever remains recognisable
and understandable as law.
Endnotes
Translated in parts by Hyo Yoon Kang. Originally published in German:
(2017) ‘Kuturtechniken des Rechts. Anmerkungen zu einem Format der
Rechtswissenschaft’ in Formate der Rechtswissenschaft, eds Funke A &
Lachmayer K Velbrueck Wissenschaft Weilerswist: 255-274.

1. Notes to translation: Rechtswissenschaft transl. as legal studies;
Kulturwissenschaften as cultural studies; Kulturtechniken des Rechts as cultural
techniques of law; Trennung as division, separation; Auseinandersetzung
as conflict, disentanglement, examination; auseinandersetzen to examine,
disentangle
2. Translator’s clarification: in contrast to applied research or practice.

3. Society does not need to have a sense of ‘social’ and can also be effective
‘asocially’.
4. As Foucault pointed out the nature of language is double (1996).

5. The notion of an ongoing openness is a remainder or a rest of a
differentiation, which has already occurred, but still remains left over.
Damisch (2007: 135) best describes the problematisation of ‘opening’ and
also refers to Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution and Heidegger’s
discussion of Heraclitus. Heidegger argues against an understanding of
opening as “an open window” or “passage”. In relations between human
and things, “human openness towards things does not mean that there is
a gap or hole through which humans can peek through” (Heidegger 1986:
202, translator’s translation).
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